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Abstract. According to (Fried, 2008), there is an intrinsic tension in trying to apply 
the history of mathematics to its didactics. Besides the widespread feeling that the 
introduction of didactic elements taken from the history of mathematics can detract 
the pedagogy of mathematics from the attainment of important goals, (Fried, 2008, p. 
193) describes a pair of specific pitfalls that can arise in implementing such 
historical applications in mathematics education. The description in (Fried, 2008),  is 
presented in the parlance of Sausserian Semiotics and identifies two semiotic 
“deformations” that arise when one fails to observe that the pairing between signs 
and meanings in a given synchronic “cross-section” associated with the development 
of mathematics need not hold for another synchronic cross section at a different time. 
In this exposition, an example related to an application of the history of the chain rule 
to the didactics of calculus is presented. Our example illustrates the semiotic 
deformations alluded by (Fried, 2008), and points out a possible explanation of how 
this may lead to unrealistic pedagogical expectations for student performance. 
Finally, an argument is presented for the creation of a framework for a historical 
heuristics for mathematics education, possibly beyond the bounds of semiotics.  
 
Keywords: chain rule; composition of functions; differentiation; historical heuristics; 
history of analysis; history of mathematics; Sausserian semiotics 
 
1. Application of Sausserian Semiotics to Mathematics  
The problem of applying the history of mathematics to mathematics education and its 
relation to semiotics is broadly discussed by (Fried, 2008). Specific examples are given of distor-
tions that arise in the application of semiotics to the history of mathematics when failure to dis-
tinguish differences between synchronic and diachronic descriptions of the body of mathematics 
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occurs. We shall not dwell on the elements of semiotics discussed there; in fact, the presentation 
in (Fried, 2008) depicts adequately the elements of semiotics relevant to the reading of this 
article, and also presents some of the details of the development of Sausserian Semiotics and its 
adequacy for framing the problem of applying the history of mathematics to mathematics 
education. Also, (Fried, 2008) dwells in a general fashion on some of the main ideas of 
semiotics, the contributions of Peirce to this field of knowledge, and also presents some exam-
ples related to the distortions that can arise in failing to differentiate between synchronic de-
scriptions of the relations between signs and meanings (both in linguistics and mathematics) that 
occur at different time frames. In this article, we employ the framework put forth by Fried (2008) 
to discuss the application of the history of mathematics to the teaching of calculus, specifically to 
the didactics of the chain rule for the differentiation of the composition of two differentiable 
functions. It will be argued that failure to make the alluded distinction between diachronically 
distinct synchronic descriptions of the body of mathematics can result in unrealistic expectations 
regarding student understanding of the chain rule.  
For the purposes of facilitating the exposition that follows, we review some of the 
descriptions presented by Fried (2008, p. 193) regarding two distortions that can arise when one 
fails to recognize the fact that the relations between signs and meanings in the history of 
mathematics, can be vastly different when diachronic differences between time periods are taken 
into account. The distortions, according to (Fried, 2008, pp. 193) are twofold. The first distortion 
consists of supposing that the synchronic relations between signs and meanings in a given 
historic period coincide with those thought to be the corresponding relations between the 
homologous signs and meanings of the present time (when mathematics education occurs). This 
distortion constitutes, in fact, the worst error a historian can make, that is, the error of 
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anachronism. The error involves contriving non existent or false synchronic relationships be-
tween signs and meanings in the given historic period. The second distortion described by Fried, 
and related to the failure to recognize diachronic differences, is the fabrication of false inferences 
regarding the evolution of signs, meanings and their pairings throughout the history of 
mathematics. In (Fried, 2008) two examples of these distortions are given, one in linguistics, due 
to Saussure (1974) himself, and another one related to the notion of function in Euler’s times 
(Fried, 2008,  p. 194).  
In this note we discuss some of the signs and meanings associated with the notions of 
derivative and composition of functions, as related to the chain rule4. The issue here is the history 
of the chain rule since the publication of L’Hospital Analyse des Infiniment Petits pour la 
Intelligence des Lignes Courbes in 1696. Succinctly stated, the modern statement of the chain 
rule is taken to be one that relates the derivative of the composition of two functions with the 
individual derivatives of the functions composed (provided, of course, certain conditions are 
satisfied). Since the idea of composition of functions seems to have appeared in the literature at 
least a century after the publication of Analyse des infiniment petits5, it is impossible that the 
signs and meanings relevant to the statement of the chain rule in the seventeenth century are the 
same as those associated with the present version of the chain rule.  
2. History of the Chain Rule  
We now present a brief relation of the evolution of the mathematical ideas and relations that 
have come to be known as the “chain rule”. The present day statement of the Chain Rule is a 
rather sophisticated one and presupposes the confluence, and consolidation of many mathemati-
cal ideas. In fact the modern statement of the Chain Rule is the following:  
                                                 
4 that is, to the rule for differentiating the composition of two differentiable functions. 
5 As far as we can tell, the first “modern” version of the chain rule appears in Lagrange’s 1797 Théorie des fonctions 
analytiques, (Lagrange, J. L., 1797, §31, pp. 29); it also appears in Cauchy’s 1823 Résumé des Leçons données a 
L’École Royale Polytechnique sur Le Calcul Infinitesimal, (Cauchy, A. L., 1899, Troisième Leçon, pp. 25). 
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Theorem 1.  
If g is differentiable at c, and f is differentiable at g(c), then gf   is differentiable at c and  
).())(()()( cgcgfcgf    
The possibility of the succinct and beautiful statement contained in Theorem 1 presupposes a 
great deal of evolution of the underlying mathematical ideas and a commensurable amount of 
“negotiations” related to the corresponding signs and meanings. Here, the functions of the state-
ment are assumed to be defined on neighborhoods of their points of differentiability, and the cor-
responding limits for the difference quotients are supposed to exist as real numbers. Furthermore, 
once the “correct” definition of the derivative for Euclidean spaces was discovered, the chain 
rule was extended to state a relation about the differentiation of composite functions on Euclid-
ean spaces, thus changing very little the formal statement of Theorem 1; see (Dieudonné,  1960).  
In (L’Hospital, 1696, p. 2), the difference of a variable y depending on an independent 
variable x is defined as the infinitesimal increment in y when x changes by an infinitesimal 
amount 0dx . In modern notation that needs little explanation: dxxydxxydy )]()([  . In 
fact, in Analysis des infiniment petits (L’Hospital, 1696), curves are considered as polygons of 
an infinite number of sides of infinitesimally small lengths, so that if we were to extend the 
“side” of the curve )(xy  that joins the points ))(,( xyx  and ))(,( dxxydxx   in the graph of y 
as a function of x, we would, in fact, obtain the tangent line to the curve at ),( yx , whose slope is, 
no more and no less, than the quotient dy/dx. It should be noted that L’Hospital (1696) used a 
geometric argument that employs the similarity of infinitesimal triangles to show that the value 
of the desired slope is infinitely close to the indicated value dy/dx. If one follows mathematical 
convention and writes )(xy  for the quotient dy/dx (and this is, indeed, a quotient!) then, the 
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relation dxxydy )(  holds for all infinitesimals dx. In fact, in Analyse des infiniment petits the 
calculus of derivatives is really the calculus of “differences” of variables.  
It may come as a surprise to the reader that nowhere in Analyse des infiniment petits, 
(L’Hospital, 1696), is the chain rule stated explicitly. This mystery is rather significant in more 
than one way. First, if we have differentiable variables y depending on u and u, in turn, 
depending on x, then duuydy )(  and dxxudu )( are the basic relations for the differences at 
the appropriate points, so that dxxuuyduuydy )()()(  . From this, again, it is clear that 
dxxuuydy )()(  , and this is the chain rule.  
Furthermore, this is true whether dx is zero or not. It may be even more surprising to realize 
that the statement of the chain rule is also absent in all of Euler’s analysis books, Introductio in 
analysin infinitorum, (Euler, 1748, Vol. 1), (Euler, 1748, Vol. 2), and Institutiones calculi 
differentialis, (Euler, 1755). Furthermore, Euler did define the notion of a function in (Euler, L., 
1748, Vol. 1), but he never treated the topic of the composition of functions in any of his writ-
ings, (Euler, 1748, Vol. 1), (Euler, 1748, Vol. 2) and (Euler, 1755).  
As far as we can tell, the first mention of the Chain Rule6 in the literature of calculus seems 
to be due to Leibniz (Child, 2007, p. 126), and it appears in a 1676 memoir (with various mis-
takes) in which he calculated 2czbzad   by means of the substitution  .czbza x 2  In 
Analyse des infiniment petits (L’Hospital, 1696, pp. 3-4), the rules for calculating the differences 
of the basic algebraic combination of (differentiable) variables are given. L’Hospital posed the 
problem of calculating the difference of rx for any “perfect or imperfect” power r (that is, for any 
rational power r) and he answers his question by proving that dxrxdx rr 1 . In keeping with the 
style of Analyse des infiniment petits, after proving general rules, L’Hospital gave instances of 
                                                 
6 as a rule for finding differences of expressions by means of substitutions.  
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the application of the rule to specific examples. In this case, the first example of the general rule 
dxrxdx rr 1  given by L’Hospital is the calculation of the difference 33 )( xayd  . The 
calculation is, as expected, a direct application of the chain rule and requires no expansion of the 
cube. No comment is made by L’Hospital to the effect that the application of the general rule 
(differentiation of the cube) to more complicated expressions necessitates an application of a 
special rule (the chain rule) whose statement or demonstration is nowhere to be found in his 
work (Campistrous, Lopez, and Rizo, 2009). 
In our view, the example provided illustrates dramatically that the anachronisms that ensue 
from failing to understand the diachronic differences between the mathematics of different times 
can betray the existence of pitfalls and ill practices in the didactics of mathematics. Informal 
experiments performed in an introductory non standard calculus course at the University of 
Puerto Rico have shown that students have significant difficulties in identifying the composed 
functions before they are able to correctly apply the chain rule. On the other hand, the level of 
understanding of the chain rule improves when the algorithm is presented as differentiation after 
a substitution of variables. To the distant observer this may seem to be a trivial difference, but 
the history of mathematics shows that the notion of composition somehow requires a higher level 
of abstraction for its understanding. Similar remarks apply to the understanding of the chain rule 
by students when it is presented in nonstandard analysis parlance as contrasted with the usual 
standard analysis presentation, which requires arguments often seemed as much to do about 
nothing. Perhaps, it should be remarked as a sobering thought, that even if all the diachronic and 
synchronic semiotic deformations in the history of mathematics can be avoided, there will still 
remain what in our view is the most interesting part of the history of mathematics (and, also, the 
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part most related to mathematics education), and that is the inferences that can be made from it 
regarding optimal strategies for classroom teaching.  
3.  Towards a Historical Heuristics for Mathematics Education  
After (Toeplitz, 1963), it has been amply regarded that the so called “genetic approach” to 
mathematics education has special advantages. Toeplitz (1963) carefully points out the 
difference between history in general, as a compilation of facts, and the history of mathematics 
in particular, as a source of ideas for teaching mathematics. He remarks: “It is not history for its 
own sake in which I am interested, but the genesis, at its cardinal points, of problems, facts and 
proofs” (Toeplitz, 1963, p. xi). In view of the semiotic considerations of this work, we venture to 
suggest the need of a sort of historic heuristics for mathematics education, in the vein, perhaps, 
of the heuristics of (Polya G., 1945) for problem solving, but which attend to the pairings the 
human mind makes between signs and meanings for the purpose of advancing mathematics 
knowledge. In our opinion, in the case of the chain rule, a strong argument can be made for the 
cognitive advantages of defining the derivative as a difference arising from an infinitesimal 
change, just like in (L’Hospital, 1696). To this, in our view, we owe the absence of explanations 
and the familiar and informal handling of the chain rule in (L’Hospital, 1696).  
Kitcher (1983, p. 229) presents some compelling arguments for what we consider to be the 
cognitive advantages of what can be called “Newton’s kinematic metaphors” (thinking of fluents 
and fluxions as positions and velocities, respectively, of moving objects; see (Kitcher, 1983, p. 
232)), and the appropriateness of infinitesimals as a cognitive vehicle for the “initial calculus7”, 
striving to describe mathematically the idea of “change”. In fact, in spite of all objections to the 
unclarities of the initial calculus, as voiced (mainly) by Bishop George Berkeley (Wilkins, 2002), 
the calculus was rapidly accepted and it developed in an unprecedented way. In the words of 
                                                 
7 the calculus developed by Newton Leibniz, the Bernoullis, L’Hospital and Euler  
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(Kitcher, 1983, p. 230): “To understand how the power of the methods introduced by Newton 
and Leibniz outweighed the unclarities which attended them, we must begin with the problems 
which interested the mathematicians of the early seventeenth century.”; and further ahead on the 
same page: “Both Newton and Leibniz introduced new language, new reasonings, new 
statements and new questions into mathematics. Some of the new expressions were not well 
understood and the workings of some of the new reasonings were highly obscure. Despite of 
these defects, the changes they proposed were accepted quite quickly by the mathematical 
community, and the acceptance was eminently reasonable.” Thus, in spite of all logical 
difficulties, the methods of the initial calculus were intensely exploited and they yielded a 
dramatic development of mathematics in general and the calculus in particular. From reading 
(Kitcher, 1983) one cannot escape the feeling that the meanings associated to the idea of an 
infinitesimal were quite adequate to capture the underlying idea of “change” and to transform it 
into the body of knowledge we know today as calculus. In fact, there are good reasons to believe 
that the Leibnizian “signs” for the calculus and the formulation of change in terms of 
infinitesimals were responsible for the faster development of European continental mathematics 
when compared to its counterpart in England; see (Grabiner, 1997). In our view these arguments 
strongly suggest a clear cognitive advantage in “thinking change” in terms of infinitesimals and, 
also, explain why the chain rule in the language of infinitesimals is obvious to the point of not 
requiring explicit justification.  
Kitcher (1983, p. 154) argues the contention that mathematical knowledge is cumulative 
when compared with scientific knowledge, which is regarded as being transformed in a more 
disruptive fashion. For instance, in resolving that the Lorenz transformations (which render 
invariant Maxwell’s laws of electromagnetism) are the basic transformations of physics, strictly 
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speaking, it is necessary to admit the incorrectness of Newton’s laws, which remain invariant 
under the Galilean transformations. This is of course consistent with (Kuhn, 1970). In 
mathematics, on the other hand, in dealing with the famous error of (Cauchy, 1882) regarding the 
continuity of the limit of a series of continuous functions, analysis suffered a very profound 
transformation which brought about the ε - δ definition of limits and the notion we know today 
as uniform converge. But, as opposed to physics, in mathematics, the previous body of 
knowledge of the calculus can be reformulated in terms of limits, and all of the “theorems” of the 
initial calculus continue to be valid in the new version of mathematical analysis that ensued from 
Cauchy, Weierstrass and others. Hence, in this sense, mathematical knowledge is cumulative. 
However, any teacher of calculus can attest to the fact of the great amount of difficulty that the 
Cauchy-Weierstrass theory of limits presents to students. This is perhaps to be expected as it 
took roughly a century from the time the initial calculus was invented to the formulation of the 
theory of limits to deal with Cauchy’s “error”. It thus seems reasonable to suggest that when 
paradigms change in mathematics (as the change towards the theory of limits after the infinitesi-
mal approach) they must have a cognitive advantage for dealing with pressing unsolved prob-
lems, but this advantage does not necessarily extend for mathematics education. In fact, teaching 
the old body of mathematical knowledge with the new paradigms, in our view, adds a heavy 
overhead to the pedagogy of the subject matter.  
Reflections related to observed advantages in student understanding when the calculus is pre-
sented in the language of infinitesimals appear in education journals; studies on this very topic, 
using Keisler’s book Foundations of Infinetisimal Calculus (Keisler, 1976)  as a textbook, have 
been made, and the observed results appear discussed in the literature (see, for example, Sullivan 
(1976)).  
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In (Kitcher, 1983, p. 155), the following qualified remark is found: “Unfortunately, the 
history of mathematics is underdeveloped, even by comparison with the history of science”. 
Clearly the topics for the explorations suggested by this brief exposition need a framework for 
the history of mathematics that lies beyond the bounds of semiotics, and these explorations are 
crucial for gaining a better understanding of the cognitive workings of the human mind as it 
strives to understand mathematics.  
It would be, indeed, a framework that must include the discussion of pairings of signs and 
meanings validated by the history of mathematics as being effective, but it must also include the 
discussion of issues like the ones raised here. This framework, a sort of historical heuristics for 
mathematics education, should set the stage for exploring the cognitive workings of the human 
mind as it grapples with signs and meanings in its quest for advancing mathematical knowledge.  
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